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CHALLENGES FOR MONETARY POLICY IN EUROLAND
1. Introduction
The launch of the euro has been an extraordinarily successful operation.
The most visible sign of this success is the fact that it took only a few weeks for
the euro to become the single European currency used in daily transactions
from Finland to Portugal and from Ireland to Greece. Until recently few people
dreamt that this would be possible in their lifetimes.
The success of the launch of the euro is not only technical and economic,
it is also and foremost political. The euro is now the most visible and practical
symbol of the progress towards a political union in Europe.
And yet despite the magnitude of the success, the challenges ahead are
formidable as well. In this address I analyse some of these challenges. The first
one has to do with the monetary policy strategy of the ECB; the second one
with the enlargement of the monetary union to a group of potentially 27 member
states. There is no doubt that the challenge arising from enlargement is the
more important one, and as will be argued will require important changes in
the operation of the monetary union in Europe.
2. The monetary policy strategy of the ECB
After more than three years of operations, it can be said that the ECB
has done a reasonably good job at maintaining price stability and at dealing
with the business cycle. During 1999-2001 annualised inflation in the Euro-
area amounted to 2.1 % on average, while at the same time the euro-area’ GDP
expanded at a yearly rate of 2.6%. Nevertheless, there is an increasing consensus
in the academic world and among market analysts that the monetary policy
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strategy of the ECB presents some flaws that can and should be amended. The
criticism focuses on two problems with this strategy. One has to do with the
objectives pursued by the ECB, the other with the instruments.
2.1 The objectives
The Treaty mandates the ECB to pursue price stability as the primary
objective. It should be noted that the Treaty uses the word primary and not sole
objective, as is sometimes erroneously concluded. According to the Treaty the
ECB should also pursue other objectives like sustaining economic activity
provided this does not endanger price stability.
The ECB, however, has given a new twist to this mandate. Its spokesmen
are now claiming that by pursuing price stability it does the best that is possible
to come close to the other objectives (growth, the business cycle). Thus,
according to this view it is all right to pursue price stability as the only objective.
In so doing the ECB also takes care of the other objectives the Treaty has
mandated (see ECB, 1999d).
In reinterpreting its mandate the ECB has been influenced by the theory
of flexible inflation targeting as developed by Svensson (1996, 2000; see also
Alesina et al., 2001; Mishkin and Schmidt Hebbel, 2001). The central claim
made by this theory is that inflation targeting makes it possible for the central
bank not only to stabilise inflation, but also to do the best possible job in
stabilising output around potential output (its “natural” level in long-run
equilibrium).
The claim that flexible inflation targeting also stabilises output is obvious
when shocks originate from the demand side. This is illustrated in Figure 24,
which represents the aggregate demand and supply curves in the inflation-
output space. Suppose there are positive and negative shocks in aggregate
demand, leading respectively to the upper and lower levels of demand shown
by the ADU and ADL curves. Potential output is given, shown by the vertical
line at y*. The central bank cannot and does not try to influence this “natural”
output level, which is determined by non-monetary variables.
Flexible inflation targeting implies that the central bank sets a target
inflation rate, π *. In a boom (ADU), the central bank raises the interest rate,
thus lowering the AD curve. In a recession it does the opposite. Because prices
are sticky the central bank allows for a gradual adjustment of inflation and
output. An attempt to bring back the aggregate demand curve downwards too
quickly could lead to a cycle where output declines from A to B. This is why
this strategy is called “flexible” inflation targeting. Stabilising inflation around
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π * also stabilises output around y*. When a central bank follows a flexible
inflation targeting strategy there is no need to explicitly target the output gap.
Figure 24: Flexible inflation targeting and demand shocks
This conclusion only holds because it is assumed that the supply curve
is linear. Figure 25 shows a non-linear supply curve, which is more realistic
than the linear supply curve of Figure 24. When inflation is low, menu costs
lead people to make infrequent price adjustments. Inflation then exhibits
considerable inertia. When inflation is high, menu costs of price changes become
trivial, and price adjustment are frequent.
The non-linear aggregate supply curve drawn in figure 25 is the
counterpart of the “New Keynesian Philips curve” developed by Akerlof,
Dickens and Perry (2000), Mankiw (2001), and Wyplosz (2001). When inflation
is low, nominal rigidities matter a lot, and inflation is unresponsive to the output
gap. The higher the inflation rate, the less significant are nominal rigidities and
the more vertical the Phillips curve (in inflation-unemployment space) and the
aggregate supply curve (in inflation-output space).
For empirical evidence of a non-linear aggregate supply curve (Phillips
curve) in the US, see  Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (2000); for several European
countries, see Wyplosz (2001).
          inflation
  
    AS
          B  A
                     π *
ADU
         AD
          ADL
        y* output
CHALLENGES FOR MONETARY POLICY IN EUROLAND366
Figure 25:  Flexible inflation targeting when supply is non-linear
The existence of a non-linearity in the supply curve has an important
implication. In a low inflation environment the rate of inflation becomes a less
reliable signal of the strength of deflationary forces. To see this, suppose we do
not observe the supply curve perfectly because of noise. Figure 26 shows a
band around the supply curve, within which the supply curve moves up and
down. We distinguish two cases: a low-inflation country where the supply curve
is relatively flat; and a high-inflation country with a steeper supply curve.
Suppose that an adverse demand shock hits these economies. In the low-
inflation country it is difficult to detect from movements of inflation alone that
an adverse demand shock has occurred. The reason is that the signal to noise
ratio is low. The signal comes from the demand shock, the noise from the random
movements in the supply curve. The flatter is the supply curve the lower is the
signal to noise ratio, and the less informative is the rate of inflation about cyclical
movements in aggregate demand. In the limit, when the supply curve becomes
horizontal, the rate of inflation is not informative about these output movements.
Conversely, when the supply curve is steeper (as is generally the case when
inflation is higher), inflation contains more information about movements in
aggregate demand.
Thus, when inflation becomes very low, as in the euro zone, inflation is
a less reliable signal in stabilising fluctuations in output produced by demand
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shocks. This forces the central bank to attach greater value to other signals (the
output gap and other “real” indicators of the business cycle). Thus, a central
bank like the ECB with a low inflation objective, but a mandate also to maintain
high levels of employment and output, should give more weight to “real” signals
of economic activity than central banks with a higher inflation target. We
conclude that the reinterpretation the ECB has given to its dual mandate is not
only unsound from a legal point of view but also from an economic one.
Figure 26:  Different inflation-targets central banks
A second problem that arises with the objectives pursued by the ECB
has to do with its practical implementation. The ECB has interpreted the
objective of price stability to mean that inflation should be held within a band
of 0% to 2%, over the medium run. It can be argued that this band is too low
and too narrow.
There are several reasons why the maximum inflation of 2% pursued by
the ECB is too low1. First, as economists have argued, some inflation is good
for the economy in that it works as a lubricant and allows for more flexible
adjustments in real wages. This analysis has been popularised recently by
Ackerlof and Perry (2000). More flexible real wages in turn reduce the
equilibrium level of unemployment. This analysis calls for a rate of inflation of
2 to 3% a year. By announcing a maximum of 2% the ECB is targeting a rate of
inflation, which according to this view, is below the optimal level, thereby
  Low-inflation-target central bank    High-inflation-target central bank
inflation inflation
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increasing the rigidities in the economy. This view leads to the conclusion that
the pursuit of too low a rate of inflation increases unemployment structurally
(see also Wyplosz, 2001) on this).
It should be stressed that this view is not shared by all economists (see
Issing, 2001). The critics have argued that the money illusion, which underlies
this view, may very well disappear in a new regime of low inflation, thereby
eliminating the need to have positive rates of inflation in order to “lubricate”
the system.
A second reason for arguing that the 0-2% band is too low is that the
ECB is pushing the inflation rate too close to zero, thereby increasing the risk
that inflation may drop below 0% at some point. We know from historical
experience (and also from the recent experience of Japan) that falling prices
are dangerous and that they can push the economy into a deflationary spiral.
Once in such a spiral it is difficult to extricate the economy from it.
A third reason is related to the previous one. If the ECB is successful in
pushing the inflation rate of Euroland within the 0 to 2% band it is almost
inevitable that, since this inflation rate is an average of national inflation rates,
the rate of inflation drops below 0% in some countries. This may then set in
motion deflationary forces in these countries that are difficult to control (see
Sinn and Reuter, 2001). This problem could be exacerbated by the Balassa-
Samuelson effect. This is that less developed countries that experience high
productivity growth in their tradable goods sector find that the resulting (non-
inflationary) wage increases in the tradable sector spread to the non-traded
sector, even though productivity in the latter is not keeping pace. As a result
CPI inflation will tend to be higher in these countries than the CPI inflation in
the more mature member countries. Put differently, the existence of Balassa-
Samuelson effects increases the differences in national inflation rates, thereby
increasing the risk that some countries’ inflation rates are pushed below 0%.
Finally the low inflation target of the ECB produces a bias against acting
quickly to counter recessionary forces. This was made clear in 2001 when the
ECB waited to lower the interest rate because the inflation rate was still above
the 2% limit. The US Fed, which does not have such a low inflation target did
not feel inhibited from acting quickly2.
2.2 Optimal inflation rates
The arguments in favour of some positive inflation are illustrated
graphically in the following figures. In figure 27 we show the costs and benefits
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of inflation.  The cost curve represents the costs resulting from misallocations,
inefficiencies and uncertainties produced by increasing rates of inflation (the
“sand effect” of inflation). The most visible (but not exclusive) way these costs
manifest themselves is by lower rates of investment and lower rates of economic
growth. This cost curve is drawn in a highly non-linear way because the empirical
literature suggests that for high rates of inflation these costs are quite substantial,
whereas for low rates of inflation (say less that 10% per year) researchers have
been unable to detect much. Thus a move from, say, 2% to 4 % inflation will
not lead to increasing costs, but a jump to, say, 20%  results in significant cost
increases.
The benefit curve is the sum of two components, which we represent in
figure 28. One is the credibility bonus, which is at its maximum when inflation
is zero. With increasing inflation this credibility bonus declines exponentially.
The second component is the benefit resulting from the “lubricant effect” of
inflation, i.e. the greater flexibility in real wages provided by inflation. This
effect tends to taper off, and even decline when inflation increases too much
(see Akerlof, Dickens and Perry(2000) and Wyplosz(2001)). The sum of the
two components is the benefit curve that is also used in figure 27.
The confrontation of costs and benefits in figure 27 then leads to the
view that there is an optimum rate of inflation π * greater than zero for which
the difference between benefits and costs is at its maximum.
The view represented in figure 27 is not shared by all economists. There
is an alternative view which can be called the “New Neo-Classical” (NNC)
view which is also the ECB-view (see Goodfriend and King, 2001). We represent
this alternative view, in figure 29. The main difference is that in figure 29 the
existence of a “lubricant” effect is denied (see Issing, 2002). As a result, the
benefit curve declines exponentially, so that the optimal rate of inflation is
zero. One remarkable aspect of this view is that its proponents rarely advocate
a zero inflation target. Not only because there could be a statistical bias in the
measurement of inflation, but also because there is a zone, called “terra
incognita” of deflation about which we know very little except that it is very
unpleasant, possibly catastrophic. For the proponents of the ECB-NNS view
there is some feeling that it is safer to keep some distance from this danger
zone, despite the fact that their analysis calls for targeting a zero rate of inflation.
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Figure 27: Costs and benefits of inflation
Figure 28: Benefits of inflation: lubricant and credibility
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Figure 29: NNC-ECB view
Let me summarise what we know and what we do not know about the
costs and benefits of inflation.
First, we know that very high inflation is very bad, not only for economic
growth but also more generally for social and political stability.
Second, deflation is also very bad, although we understand the
deflationary dynamics less well. But horror stories of the 1930s are strong
enough to make us fear deflation.
Third, we know very little about the intermediate zone of low inflation.
There are conflicting theories about the shape of the benefit curve, and the
empirical evidence if it exists is not very reliable. In addition, although we are
sure that with high inflation the costs become substantial, we know very little
about the question of when these costs start to matter. Do these costs become
visible when inflation exceeds 2%, or 5% or 7%. Nobody knows, because the
empirical evidence for this low inflation range is simply not available.
This uncertainty has a number of implications for monetary policies.
First, it implies that we beware of too much precision in setting the target for
the inflation rate. When knowledge is imprecise it is generally not a good idea
to pretend we possess precise information. Such an attitude can lead to a situation
where systematic errors are made, and we would not even be aware of it.
Second, some flexibility is called for. When we do not know what the
optimal inflation rate is, it is generally a good idea to keep one’s options open
      Costs and benefits
  of inflation
TERRA
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by being flexible about the target.
Does the ECB asymmetric inflation target (inflation should be at most
2%) correspond to these two principles? My answer is no. The ECB asymmetric
inflation target imposes the wrong type of precision. By restricting the possible
inflation rates to the 0%-2% range it denies that the optimal inflation rate could
be higher, although the scientific evidence about this is unclear. In fact the
range is even smaller since the ECB has acknowledged some statistical bias in
measuring inflation. If this is, say, 0.5% then the target range is even smaller3
i.e. 0.5 to 2%. This is an example of too much precision. We simply do not
know enough to be sure that this is the correct range to aim for.
The 0% to 2% band is too narrow for another reason. The economy is
often subjected to shocks making a precise control of the rate of inflation very
difficult. The narrower the band, the less often the rate of inflation will be
observed within the band. A narrow band therefore creates an issue of credibility.
The ECB may face this problem. The 0% to 2% band makes it quite likely that
the observed inflation will be outside the band much of the time raising questions
about the credibility of the strategy. This may already be a problem. Since the
start of EMU on January 1 the observed monthly rate of inflation has been
outside the target band more than 60% of the time (see figure 30).
This criticism of the inflation target of the ECB calls for the formulation
of a different target. One such new target band policy could be to define the
target of 2% as the midpoint of a band of 3%, i.e. 1.5% below and above the
midpoint4. Such a target comes closer to what is now considered to be the
optimal rate of inflation and the margin is wider allowing the ECB to follow a
more credible strategy.
It should be stressed that this proposed new target range will not
undermine the anti-inflationary credibility of the ECB. Instead of a target range
that the ECB has been unable to keep, the new target range is realistic and
therefore more credible. In fact the formulation of this target would have allowed
the ECB to maintain the inflation rate within the target band most of the time.
It also comes closer to what other major central banks are doing today.
The previous discussion also calls into question the goal independence
of the ECB. The literature on central bank independence has made a distinction
between goal independence and instrument independence. There is a wide
consensus that the central bank should enjoy instrument independence. There
is much less consensus about goal independence. In fact, in several countries
(e.g. the UK) the central bank enjoys instrument independence, but not goal
independence, i.e. the government fixes the target and leaves the central bank
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then free to decide how best to achieve this target.  This is a model towards
which the ECB will probably have to move.
Figure 30: Inflation rate in the euro area
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2.3 The instruments
The ECB has been very much influenced by the Bundesbank legacy
which itself was much influenced by the monetarist analysis made popular by
Milton Friedman, i.e. that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary
phenomenon. This view has led the ECB to give a prominent role to money in
its monetary policy strategy (the so-called first pillar). In particular it has led to
the formulation of a reference value for the growth rate of money (M3) of 4.5%
that should not be exceeded. The ECB is careful in stressing that this reference
value should not be applied mechanically5. Nevertheless it is striking that the
ECB is now the only central bank in the industrial world giving such prominence
to money in the formulation of its monetary policy strategy. All other central
banks have, with good reason, abandoned this approach. There is a great deal
of evidence that in a low inflation environment and in a world of frequent
financial innovations the money supply numbers are very unreliable as signals
of future inflation. Giving prominence to money can lead the central bank to
make the wrong move.
The problem with much of the empirical research about the long run
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relation between money growth and inflation is that it includes a lot of
observations on periods of relatively high inflation (in time series analysis) or
on countries with high rates of inflation. This problem is well illustrated in the
following cross-section evidence (figure 31). It shows a very tight relation
between the 30-year average of inflation and money growth in a sample of
more than one hundred countries. Subjecting this kind of evidence to regression
analysis invariably finds that the hypothesis of strict proportionality between
inflation and money growth cannot be rejected and that most, if not all, of the
differentials in inflation between countries can be explained by differentials in
money growth. This kind of cross-section evidence has now invaded textbooks
to show that the evidence in favour of the quantity theory is overwhelming.
(See for example, Parkin, Powell and Matthews, 2000).
When one looks at a subsample of countries with low inflation, things
get fuzzier. We show this in figure 32 where we present a subsample of countries,
which have experienced an average rate of inflation of 5% or less during 1970-
1999. We observe now that there is very little relation between inflation and
money growth in these ‘low’6 inflation countries. Put differently, long-term
sustained differences in money growth between countries are uninformative
about the differences in their rates of inflation, nor is the finding altered when
one corrects for differences in the growth of output7.
It is not difficult to understand this result. Money supply statistics are
full of noise. In a low inflation environment where inflation is only a few percent
a year, the observed differences in the money supply growth numbers contain
mostly noise, and say little about differences in monetary policies (the signal).
All this confirms what many critics have been saying about the first
pillar of the ECB monetary policy strategy, i.e. that the prominence given to
money in guiding monetary policies is mistaken (see e.g. Svensson, 2001).
Given that it is the ambition of the ECB to keep the rate of inflation below 2%,
success on the inflation front will make the yearly money growth numbers
even less informative about the inflationary potential in the economy than
appears from figure 32, because the noise to signal ratio will be even higher.
In fact the ECB is aware of this problem. Since 1999, the growth rate of
money (M3) has been above the target most of the time. The result has been
that the ECB has had to ignore the money supply numbers most of the time.
This leads to a credibility problem. The ECB announces a target for the money
growth but in fact does not take this target into account in its policy decisions.
In doing so, it gives signals about its intentions, which it then fails to follow.
This is bound to harm the credibility of the ECB.
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Figure 31: Inflation and money growth in a sample of more than one hundred countries
Figure 32:  Inflation and money growth in “low” inflation countries
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, CD-Rom, Aug. 2001
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In order to avoid this credibility problem in the future, the ECB will
have to amend its “two-pillar” strategy and to drop the prominence it gives to
the money stock in its monetary policies.  As in the case of the inflation target,
this will allow the ECB to gain in credibility. It will not be put in the
uncomfortable situation anymore in which it has to explain all too often why it
does not want to take the latest money growth numbers seriously.
In contrast to the ECB, the US Fed has learned this lesson. Since the
second half of the 1980s it has systematically downgraded the importance of
money growth numbers. Today, these numbers play almost no role in setting
monetary policies. This has saved Greenspan the trouble of having to explain
with a great degree of frequency why the money growth targets were not met.
3. The challenge of enlargement
The most important challenge facing the European monetary union is
the enlargement with ten countries from Central Europe and with Malta and
Cyprus. This enlargement creates two problems that have to be tackled. The
first problem has to do with the effectiveness of monetary policies in the enlarged
EMU; the second problem relates to the institutional reforms that will have to
be introduced to make the system workable.
 3.1 Is the enlarged EMU an optimal currency area?
With a potential of 27 members of EMU instead of the present 12 the
challenge for the ECB to conduct monetary policy in an effective way will
increase. The reason is that in such a large group the probability of “asymmetric
shocks” will increase significantly. Thus some countries may experience a boom
and inflationary pressures while at the same time others experience deflationary
forces.
It has sometimes been argued that with the intensification of the
integration process the potential for asymmetric shocks will abate. Maybe,
maybe not. An optimistic view is represented graphically in figure 33. On the
vertical axis we set out the degree of asymmetry of shocks between clusters of
countries. We call this divergence. On the horizontal axis we set out the degree
of economic integration among these countries. All the points to the right of
the OCA line are points where clusters of countries form an optimal currency
area, i.e. the benefits exceed the costs. The OCA line is upward sloping for the
following reason. More divergence makes a monetary union more costly.
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Conversely, more integration reduces the costs (increases the benefits) of a
monetary union. As a result an increase in divergence must be compensated by
more integration to make a monetary union worthwhile (in terms of costs and
benefits).
The downward sloping arrows give us the dynamics of the relation
between integration and divergence. In the optimistic view we present here,
when clusters of countries integrate more they face less asymmetric shocks,
and thus less divergence. The negative slope comes from the fact that economic
integration increases intra-industry specialisation, which tends to make the
economic structures of countries more alike.
In figure 33 we represent two clusters of countries. The EU-12 (the present
Euroland) is assumed not to be an optimal currency area as yet8. However, the
dynamics of integration (which is stimulated by the monetary union itself)
moves it down along the arrows so that it will soon reach the OCA-zone. Here,
the costs for individual countries of being subjected to asymmetric shocks and
not being able to use one’s national monetary policies to deal with them are
small compared to the benefits of the union. In this zone the constraints imposed
by a monetary policy that must fit all sizes are not perceived to create
unacceptably high costs.
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Consider now what happens when other countries join Euroland. We
represent the full cluster of countries (of Euroland and newcomers) by EU-27.
It is reasonable to assume that this cluster of countries will be located higher
up on a downward sloping line, reflecting the fact that EU-27 is less well
integrated than EU-12 and that it faces more asymmetric shocks.
The important insight from this analysis is that the original members of
Euroland (who are also part of EU-27) will now have to wait longer until they
reach the OCA zone9.  Practically this means that since in the enlarged Eurozone
the shocks are more asymmetric than in the original one, some of the original
members will more often than today be outliers (in terms of inflation and output)
compared to the average that the ECB will be focusing on. As a result, these
members will perceive the policies of the ECB to be less receptive to shocks
than it did before the enlargement. Some of the original members of the
Eurozone may then find that the cost-benefit calculus about monetary union
has become less favourable.
This analysis is not very much affected if we assume a pessimistic
scenario about the relation between integration and asymmetric shocks. We
show this case in figure 34. We now assume that the relation between integration
and divergence is positively sloped, i.e. as clusters of countries integrate more,
they become less alike, and therefore they are subjected to more asymmetric
shocks. This scenario may prevail when the integration process leads to
agglomeration effects that are induced by economies of scale (see
Krugman,1993).
In this pessimistic scenario, the major conclusion of the previous sections
still holds: the enlargement sets back the movement towards the OCA zone. As
a result, countries that now consider the cost benefit calculus of monetary union
to be favourable may very well think differently in an enlarged union. While
today most of the members of Euroland probably find that the interest rate
decisions of the ECB are consistent with their national economic conditions
most of the time, this may no longer be the case in an enlarged EMU. It will
happen more frequently that some countries consider the monetary stance taken
by the ECB to be inappropriate to deal with the economic situation of the
moment. As a result, the perceived costs of the union will increase relative to
the perceived benefits of the single currency. Such a situation is bound to produce
tensions both inside the decision making process of the Eurosystem as well as
outside the system when some countries feel that their economic interests are
not well served by the ECB.
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Figure  34: Degrees of divergence and of economic integration - the pessimistic
scenario
There is very little the ECB can do about this. By its very nature a
monetary union implies that the power to set interest rates is transferred to a
common central bank which can only set one interest rate. Fine-tuning of the
interest rate to cater for different national economic conditions is made
impossible. This is the price the members of the union pay for the benefits they
obtain from the existence of one currency.
The only way to deal with these issues is to make sure that individual
member countries have the instruments to deal with these asymmetric
developments. In this context progress towards reform of the labour markets
aiming at making these more flexible is of great importance. Flexibility is one
of the major  instruments available that allow eurozone countries to adjust to
asymmetric shocks. In addition, a move towards budget balance will allow
countries to exploit the margins of flexibility provided by the stability pact so
that the automatic fiscal stabilisers can operate fully.
3.2 Enlargement and institutional reform
Enlargement is bound to have important implications for the decision
making process within the Eurosystem. The present system is characterised by
equal representation of each member country in the Governing Council through
the presidents (governors) of the national central banks. When, like today, the
number of countries is limited to twelve, such a system can work satisfactorily.
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achieving a consensus about the stance of monetary policy will be much harder
than today10. This is due not only to the larger numbers of persons involved in
such a system, but also because, as we argued earlier, there will be more
asymmetric developments in an enlarged euro zone. These asymmetries will
necessarily lead to different perceptions among the national governors about
what the most appropriate course of action is for the euro zone as a whole.
The problem can be illustrated using a very simple model in the following
way. In figure 35 we present the interest rates that are desired by the twelve
governors of the Eurosystem. We take the view that there are asymmetric
developments leading each governor to compute an interest rate, which is
optimal for his own country11. Thus each governor desires a different interest
rate to prevail in the Eurosystem and we assume that these desired interest
rates are distributed uniformly between 3% and 4.1%. This is shown by the
horizontal line. Figure 12 also shows the relative size of each country as
measured by GDP. For example, Germany’s GDP represents 30% of the total
and Germany desires an interest rate of 3.4%. We make the further assumption
that the ECB Board (6 members) has the same desired interest rate and that this
is obtained by an analysis of the euro-wide economic conditions. Thus the
ECB-Board computes the optimal interest rate using the Eurosystem wide
average of inflation and output. This implies that the ECB-Board takes a
weighted average of the nationally desired interest rates, where the weights are
the GDP-shares12. This yields the result that the ECB-board desires an interest
rate of 3.5%. Thus, 7 members of the Governing Council (6 Board members
and one governor) desire the same 3.5%. This feature produces a peak in the
distribution of desired interest rates around 3.5%.
It is now obvious that the ECB-Board will have a strategic position in
the decision making process. It will have to find only two extra votes to have a
majority for its interest rate proposal. These can easily be found among the two
governors that are close to the ECB-board’s desired interest rate. Note that it
will be very difficult for other coalitions to beat the ECB-board’s proposal
because such a coalition would have to span both those governors who desire a
higher interest rate and those who desire a lower one. The nice thing about this
result is that the Governing Council will select the interest rate that is optimal
for the system as a whole, even if each national governor is only concerned
about the economic conditions prevailing in his country. It is clear that if the
national governors disregard the national economic conditions and care only
about the Eurosystem’s average economic conditions (as they claim they do)
the result will be the same. Thus whether the national governors care about the
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Euro-wide economic conditions or not does not make a difference.
The previous description is nothing but an application of the median
voter theorem. The ECB-Board which is averaging the desires of national
governors will be close to the desired interest rate of the median governor, (at
least if these desires are symmetrically distributed). In a majority voting system
the median voter’s preferences prevail.
Note that since the strategic position of the ECB-Board is so powerful, it
is unlikely that the members of the Governing Council will come to explicit
voting. Everybody is aware that whatever the Board is proposing will almost
certainly find a majority.
Figure 35: Distribution of desired interest rates in the eurozone (symmetric case)
How is this result affected by other distributions of the desired interest
rates? In order to analyse this question we computed the desired interest rates
using a Taylor rule on real economic data for the year 2002. Thus each central
bank computes its desired interest rate using the following Taylor rule
r*t = ρ  + π * + a(π t - π *) + b xt (1)
where r*t is the desired interest rate, r is the long term real interest rate, π * is
the inflation target and xt  is the output gap. We assume that each governor uses
the same Taylor rule (expressing identical preferences). The only difference
between the governors is that their national inflation rates and output gaps
differ. The ECB-Board does the same exercise, using the euro-wide averages
of these two variables. We set ρ  = 3%; π * = 2%; a = 1.5 and b = 0.5. The latter
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two coefficients have often been found to have such orders of magnitude. (See
Alesina, et al. (2001)). We applied the exercise to the year 2002 using OECD,
Economic Outlook.
We  show the result in figure 36. We now find that the ECB-Board’s
desired interest rate (3.86%)  is different from the median desired interest rate
(which is between 4.45 and 5%). This follows from the fact that the large
countries experienced slow economic activity in the year 2002 compared to
the other, mostly smaller countries, and that the former have a large share in
the averaging procedure applied by the ECB-Board. Thus the ECB-Board
desired interest rate is relatively close to the desires of the large countries which
represent about 70% of the euro area’s GDP.
Figure 36: Distribution of desired interest rates and country size (Taylor rule, 2002)
It can now be seen that despite the fact that the ECB-Board’s desired
interest rate diverges from the median, the ECB-Board should have few
difficulties in forcing its desire to pass in the Governing Council. All the Board
has to do is to find three votes for its proposal. It will likely find it among the
three central banks whose desired interest rate is close to 3.86%. In this example
this is the French and the Finnish governor. In addition, despite the asymmetry
in the distribution there are only 8 governors available for a coalition in favour
of a higher interest rate than 3.86. In order to beat the ECB-Board’s proposal
10 votes are necessary.
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We conclude that in the present situation the ECB-Board has a strategic
position within the Governing Council, which is maintained even when the
distribution of desired interest rates is different among large and small countries,
as happened in 2002. As a result, the decision making process within the
Governing Council ensures that the interest rate that will be decided is the
optimal one from the point of view of the Eurosystem as a whole.
Things will be very different in an enlarged Eurosystem. We first present
figure 37 which is similar to figure 35 and which presents the distribution of
desired interest rates in the enlarged Eurosystem consisting of 27 members.
Thus the Governing Council consists of 33 members, which means that an
interest rate proposal must have 17 votes to obtain a majority. We first assume
that the distribution of the desired interest rates among small and large countries
is approximately symmetric. As before, the ECB-Board computes the desired
interest rate for the Eurosystem as a whole (the weighted average of the
nationally desired interest rates).
A first thing to observe is that the ECB-board’s strategic position is
weakened. It will now have to find 11 governors to back its proposal for its
desired interest rate of 3.8%. Since one governor has the same desired interest
rate of 3.8%, ten governors with different desires must be found to obtain a
majority.
Figure 37:  Distribution of desired interest rates and country size in the euro-27
(symmetric case)
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Despite the fact that the ECB-board must make a greater effort to find
the backing for its proposal, it can also be seen that the ECB-board still has a
strong position. The reason is that its proposal (the mean) is very close to the
median proposal. As a result, coalitions to defeat the ECB’s proposal will be
difficult to find. For example, the number of governors in favour of an interest
rate higher than 3.8 amounts to only 13 (remember that one needs 17 votes to
form a majority). Similarly the governors desiring less than 3.8% can only
muster 13 votes. Thus, the ECB-Board will most likely be able to find a majority.
We construct the asymmetric case in a similar way as in figure 35, i.e.
using the same Taylor rule as in equation (1) using data for 2002. We did this
for the present members of the Eurosystem and for the UK, Denmark and
Sweden. For the accession countries we lacked data on output gaps. We,
therefore, assumed that the desired interest rates of the accession countries
would be distributed uniformly within the same range as the one obtained for
the other countries. We assumed, however, that because of a Balassa-Samuelson
effect, the observed inflation rates in accession countries are 0.5% above the
inflation rates of the other countries.
The result is shown in figure 38. Our results are now very different. The
difference between the ECB-board’s desired interest rate, 4.18%, (the mean) is
now significantly lower than the median desired interest rate, 5%. As a result,
a coalition of mostly small countries desiring a higher interest rate than 4.18%








































Figure 38:  Distribution of desired interest rates in the euro-27 (Taylor rule, 2002)
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can now be found, thereby defeating the ECB board’s proposal13. It is therefore
possible that an interest rate decision is made that suits the interests of a coalition
of small countries that represent a small fraction of the Eurosystems’s GDP. In
the example of figure 38, this coalition represents only 34% of the GDP in the
Eurosystem. This interest rate would not be optimal for the Eurosystem as a
whole. If such a scenario were to materialise it would likely lead to grave
conflicts within the Eurosystem. It is by no means implausible, because the
Taylor rule used for EU15, captures reasonably well what central banks desire
and the Balassa-Samuelson effect we assumed for accession countries is
relatively small.
The problem we have identified can be summarized as follows. In the
present set-up the ECB Board has a strategic position in the decision making
process within the Eurosystem. This ensures that the interest rate decisions are
made on the basis of the needs of Euroland as a whole. This is so even if the
national governors are guided by the economic conditions that prevail in their
own countries. It holds a fortiori if the national governors only take euro-
aggregates into account in their decisions.  Since the large countries (Germany,
France, Italy) represent about 70% of the total, this decision making model
also ensures that the large country’s interests are relatively well served, despite
the overrepresentation of the small countries in the Governing Council. Because
of the strategic position of the ECB-Board a consensus can usually be reached
easily around the interest rate proposals made by the Board. As a result, formal
voting is usually not necessary.
In an enlarged Eurosystem this consensus model is likely to break down.
The reason is that the ECB-Board will loose its strategic position. As a result,
winning coalitions of small countries will become possible and national
governors will face greater temptations to take into account national economic
conditions in the decision making process. It follows that in an enlarged Euro-
system, the Board will be confronted by the possibility that its interest rate
proposals will be overruled by coalitions of small countries who experience
economic conditions different from the average (which is dominated by the
large countries). This will create the possibility that interest rate decisions will
be made on the basis of  economic conditions that prevail in a relatively small
part of Euroland. This is bound to lead to grave conflicts within the Eurosystem.
The essence of the problem is that the small countries are over-represented
in the Governing Council and this over-representation will be aggravated in an
enlarged Eurosystem. To lessen the risk that small countries in the Governing
Council over-ride the Board’s strategic position the over-representation of small
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countries would have to be reduced.  This can be achieved in several ways. We
discuss some possible formulas14.
•T he US Fed formula: this consists in allowing all governors to participate in
the deliberations of the Governing Council but to restrict the voting rights
to a limited number of governors (e.g. ten) on a rotating basis.
•T he IMF formula: this consists in having small countries group together in
constituencies and be represented by one governor.
• The centralised formula: this consists in restricting the decision making to
the Executive Board of the ECB. Today the Board consists of six members.
In this formula there is some scope for expanding the size of the Board.
The third formula is probably too drastic. The advantage of the first
formula is political. By introducing a system of rotation in the voting, one does
not have to discriminate between small and large countries. The effect on the
outcome will be broadly the same whether it is small or large countries, which
are allowed to vote since this rotation system reinstates the strategic position of
the ECB-Board. Large countries, however, may not like this solution. As a
result, a combination of the first and second formula could be a reasonable
compromise whereby groups of smaller countries delegate one of their governors
on a rotating basis15.
4. Conclusion
The introduction of the euro has been spectacularly successful. This
success should not make us complacent. The challenges ahead are formidable
as well. We have argued that although the record of the ECB is a positive one,
some changes in its monetary policy strategy are required. At present there is
too large a discrepancy between the announced policy strategy and the policy
actions of the ECB. This discrepancy hurts the credibility of the ECB. For
example, in its monetary policy strategy the ECB claims that the growth rate of
M3 (the first pillar) is the most important signal it is looking at, and yet the
facts show that it barely takes money growth into account. In order to gain
credibility, the ECB will have to abandon the importance it gives to money
growth numbers.
A similar credibility arises with the ECB’s inflation target. It has been
set unrealistically low. As a result, the ECB has not been able to keep its promise
of maintaining the rate of inflation below 2%. This hurts the credibility of the
ECB, and may also be damaging to the real economy.
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We  also discussed the major challenge of enlargement. to a zone of
potentially twenty-seven countries which will affect the effectiveness of the
ECB in maintaining monetary and financial stability within the euro zone. This
is so for two reasons. First, the enlargement is likely to change the perceptions
of costs and benefits of the union for the present members of Euroland,
increasing the costs relative to the benefits. Consequently, countries will face
more often than today the possibility that ECB interest rate decisions do not
reflect their national interests. There is very little the ECB can do about this. As
a result, the pressure on countries to increase labour market flexibility will
increase, which for most people in the labour market is not a comfortable
prospect.
Second, enlargement creates the risk that the ECB-Board will loose its
strategic position and that the interest rate decisions will stop representing the
needs of Euroland as a whole. This could create strong conflicts within the
Governing Council, and may necessitate a streamlining of the Governing
Council to reduce the weight of the small countries in the decision making
process. The challenges ahead are serious but can be overcome, provided timely
reforms are undertaken.
1 Note that since the ECB considers 2% to be a maximum it must be targeting a rate of inflation below 2%.
2 In Begg et al. (2002), it is argued that although the ECB reacted slowly to the emergence of the recession
of 2001, it did reduce the interest rate in the end in a way that the Fed, had it experienced the same shock as
in Europe would probably also have done.
3  The Boskin report estimated this bias in the US to be between 0.8 and 1.6 % see Boskin Report (1996).
There are no comparable estimates in Euroland, but it would be surprising if the bias were very different
from the US one.
4  It should be pointed out that some central banks, e.g. the Bank of England, do not have a formal band. We
do not go into the issue here of the merits of formal versus informal bands.
5 For a thorough analysis and justification of the ECB two-pillar monetary policy strategy see Issing, et al.
(2000).
6  Many central bankers today would not call a yearly rate of inflation of 4 or 5% maintained during thirty
years a low rate of inflation. If we restrict our subsample of low inflation countries to those countries with
inflation less than 3% a year, the absence of a link between inflation and money growth is even more
striking.
7 See De Grauwe and Polan (2001), De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2001).
8  As will become clear this assumption does not diminish the power of the arguments we are making here.
9  If the EU-12 is in the OCA-zone when enlargement occurs, it will no longer be after enlargement.
10 See Baldwin et al. (2001) for a detailed analysis of the decision-making problems in an enlarged European
Union.
NOTES
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11 Officially the governors are not supposed to do this. It is doubtful, however, whether governors do not take
the national economic conditions into account. There is interesting evidence that even in the US Fed, regional
interests play a role in monetary policy decisions. See Meade and Sheets (2002).
12 See Aksoy, De Grauwe and Dewachter (2002).
13 This does not mean that such a coalition will necessarily be found. The point is that it is now a serious
possibility.
14  For a detailed discussion of these various proposals, see Baldwin et al. (2001).
15  It is unclear, though, whether this solution is consistent with the Nice Treaty which says that the rebalancing
of the votes should not introduce discriminations between countries.
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